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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2)(h) 
(1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the trial court erred in awarding $600.00 per month alimony? 
A. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's Brief, page 2). 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion to adjust divorcing parties' financial and property 
interests." Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah App. 1988). 
B. This issue was preserved in the Record at R. 91, 107, 115. 
II. Whether the trial court erred by failing to order Husband to sell the marital residence 
or pay out Wife's equity therein? 
A. The standard of review for this issue is also an abuse of discretion. 
(Appellant's Brief, page 2). See Throckmorton, at 122. 
B. This issue was preserved in the Record at R. 107, 115, 281 (Tr. 155-56). 
III. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Wife's request that Husband pay one-half 
of uncovered medical expenses and insurance premiums upon the expiration of her health 
insurance COBRA coverage? 
A. The standard of review for this issue is similarly an abuse of discretion. See 
Throckmorton, at 122. 
B. This issue was preserved in the Record at R. 91, 103, 104. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred by ordering the Husband to reimburse one-half of the 
loans that Husband had taken out against the Wife's whole-life insurance policy? 
1 
A. The standard of review for this issue is similarly an abuse of discretion. See 
Throckmorton, at 122 
B. This issue was preserved in the Record at 104, 115, 284-287 (Tr. 158-161). 
V. Whether the trial court erred by awarding Wife $1,000.00 of her attorney's fees? 
A. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. An award of attorney fees in 
divorce actions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). 
B. This issue was preserved in the Record at 90-91, 100, 103, 113. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is determinative in nature to 
this appeal. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case and course of proceedings. 
The Appellant's statements regarding the nature of the case and course of proceedings 
are accurate. 
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B. Statement of the Facts. 
The parties (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Astin and Ms. Astin) were married on 
April 12, 1962. (R. I l l ) (Tr. 12). The parties separated on September 13, 1993. (Tr. 13). 
Five children were born as issue to the marriage. At the time of trial, there was one child of 
which remained a minor, to-wit: Emily, born July 7, 1978. (R. 111). Emily has resided 
with Mr. Astin in the family home since the date of separation. (Tr. 15). 
Ms. Astin, born September 3, 1941, was fifty-two years of age at the time of trial. 
(Tr. 66). Though Ms. Astin was primarily a homemaker during the marriage, she worked 
for a hospital for approximately four years. (Tr. 73). Ms. Astin also attended school during 
the years of 1991 through 1993, during which time she was an honor student in Elementary 
Education. (Tr. 105-106). 
At the trial, Dr. David Bennion testified that Ms. Astin was very depressed and had 
multiple personality disorder (dissociative disorder). (Tr. 55). Because of her severe 
depression, her memory is affected as well as her ability to sleep or remain awake. It was 
Dr. Bennion's opinion that Ms. Astin's prognosis was poor as returning to the work place in 
the near future. (Tr. 58). Because of her disability, Ms. Astin receives $429.00 per month 
in social security disability benefits. (R. 110). The minor child, Emily, also received social 
security in the amount of $189.00 per month as a result of Ms. Astin's disability. (R. 92, 
108). 
Due to her severe depression, Ms. Astin has become suicidal and has been 
hospitalized to protect her from harming herself. (R. 188-89) (Tr. 61, 62). In December of 
1993, she was hospitalized for about 10 days. In 1994, she was hospitalized for a four week 
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period. She was also hospitalized at the time of the trial. (Tr. 83, 84). Since april of 1994, 
Ms. Astin has resided with her sister. (Tr. 66). Dr. Bennion testified that this is a healthy 
living situation. (Tr. 62). Though Dr. Bennion testified that Ms. Astin could care for herself 
if living alone (Tr. 59), he did not know if it would be more healthy if she were to leave and 
live by herself. It would depend on her stressors. (Tr. 62). 
Mr. Astin, born March 28, 1935, was 59 years of age at the time of trial. (Tr. 17). 
He was principally employed by Prudential Insurance Company (Tr. 13) as an insurance 
salesman and also acted as an independent broker for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, Gem 
Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. (R. 110). 
In July of 1991, Mr. Astin had a heart attack which required a triple bypass operation 
shortly thereafter. (Tr. 17). He was unable to return to work until January of 1992. (Tr. 
20). He received disability insurance income through the balance of 1991. Following the 
heart attack, Mr. Astin has experience fatigue, stress, and depression. Coped with his age, 
he is not able to put in the time and effort to produce insurance sales like he used to. (Tr. 
17, 18). 
Mr. Astin's taxable income for the years of 1991 through 1993 were as follows: (a) 
$44,839.00 in 1993; (b) $63,074.00 in 1992; and (c) $49,062.00 in 1991. (R. 109-110). His 
1992 income was unusually high as it included $19,114.91 worth of policy renewals which 
accumulated during the time he was on disability in 1991 (Tr. 20). As a result, the trial 
court deducted $19,100 from the 1992 earnings to determine an appropriate average annual 
income from 1991 through 1993 which was found to be $45,958.33, and average monthly 
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income of $3,829.36. (R. 93, 109). The court did not take into consideration Mr. Astin's 
1994 average gross monthly income, which was $3,069.00 at the time of trial. 
Though Mr. Astin testified that he had average monthly job expenses of $655.00, the 
trial court allowed only one-half of such expenses or $328.00 per month. (R. 93, 109). 
After deducting the $328.00 in job expenses as well as the average withholding for federal, 
state and social security taxes during the years 1991 through 1993 ($875.72), the trial court 
found that Mr. Astin's net average monthly income was $2,626.64. (R. 92, 108). The trial 
court further determined that an appropriate reduction for Mr. Astin's monthly living 
expenses would be $1,900.00, leaving only $726.64 remaining as disposable income. (R. 92, 
108). 
Mr. Astin was ordered to pay $1,000.00 per month for temporary alimony (R. 22). 
This caused great financial strain. To stay current, Mr. Astin was required to borrow money 
from his insurance policies as well as liquidate assets in his 401K or borrow on his 401K. 
(Tr. 28). Mr. Astin testified that the most he could pay for alimony was maybe between 
$300.00 and $400.00 a month. (Tr. 28). 
The trial court ordered Mr. Astin to pay alimony in the amount of $600.00. The 
court based this upon Mr. Astin's net average monthly income of $2,984.64* and Ms. 
Astin's net average monthly income of $429.00, as well as taking into consideration the 
parties needs and responsibilities. (R. 91, 107). 
*It is unclear where the court came up with the figure of $2,984.64 for net average 
monthly income. The court had previously determined that the net average monthly income 
for Mr. Astin was $2,626.64. In its analysis, the trial court used $2,626.64 for calculation 
purposes. 
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In that Emily, the remaining minor child, had two years left in high school, Mr. Astin 
was awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the home until Emily graduates from high 
school with her class or turns 18, whichever occurs last. This would enable emily to 
continue to enjoy the same security and surroundings that her siblings have enjoyed during 
their minority. (R. 107). The court did not feel it was appropriate to dislodge Emily from 
her schooling nor force her to go somewhere else where Mr. Astin could afford to rent 
another house. (Tr. 155). 
Initially, Mr. astin was willing to have the trial court award a decree of separate 
maintenance rather than a decree of divorce to enable Ms. Astin to be maintained on his 
medical coverage. Subsequently, however, Mr. Astin was advised by an ecclesiastical leader 
that his church's policy would prohibit him from dating and pursuing social relationships 
unless he is legally divorced. For this reason, Mr. Astin decided to get a divorce. Since 
Mr. Astin wanted a divorce, the trial court did not award separate maintenance. (Tr. 153). 
Though Ms. Astin's COBRA coverage would expire in three years, the trial court felt 
that it would be a matter of speculation at the time of trial to determine that she would be 
uninsurable after the COBRA coverage expired. (R. 91, 103, 104). Thus, the trial court 
determined that if this possibility became reality, Ms. Astin could petition the court for a 
modification of the divorce decree based upon a material change of circumstances. (R. 91, 
103). 
Throughout the marriage, Mr. Astin established a number of life insurance policies 
which accumulated cash values. For estate tax purposes, Mr. Astin established a term 
insurance policy of which Ms. Astin was made the owner thereof. This policy was 
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converted in 1983 to a permanent policy and began to accumulate cash value. The premium 
payments were maintained by Mr. Astin. (Tr. 122). These policies were used as savings 
accounts and Mr. Astin took out loans against the various policies. (Tr. 122, 129-132). Mr. 
Astin testified that he borrowed against the policy established in Ms. Astin's name to pay 
for expenses in the home, Christmas expenses, and for Ms. Astin's schooling. (Tr. 122). 
He did this without consulting Ms. Astin. (Tr. 94). As the money was borrowed to pay for 
family expenses, the trial court awarded the policy to Ms. Astin and ordered Mr. Astin to 
restore one-half of the value of said loans. (R. 104). 
The trial court heard each of the parties testify to the need and ability to pay 
attorney's fees. Ms. Astin's attorney proffered that Ms. Astin's fees and costs were 
$3,579.00. Mr. Astin testified that he was having a hard time paying for his own attorney 
fees. (Tr. 29). The court recognized that neither party has the ability to pay significant 
attorneys fees and ordered that Mr. Astin should contribute $1,000.00 towards Ms. Astin's 
attorneys fees. (R. 103, 113). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Procedurally, Ms. Astin's appeal is fatally defective and should be rejected. The 
issues on appeal were not delineated nor did Ms. Astin include citations to the record 
showing that each issue was preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 24(a)(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. More importantly, Ms. Astin failed to marshall the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. This deficiency alone is sufficient to 
warrant denial of Ms. Astin's appeal. 
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The trial court was faced with the prospect of trying to equitably satisfy the various 
needs of the parties with very limited resources available. Unfortunately, Ms. Astin is not 
receiving what she would like, while Mr. Astin is having to pay more than he feels he is able 
to. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and entered a 
ruling which was fair and equitable. 
The trial court recognized and considered the essential factors in determining whether 
alimony should be awarded: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Detailed findings carefully 
outline the court's rationale for awarding the $600.00 per month for alimony. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Astin was awarded the care, custody, and control of the 
remaining minor child, Emily. With two years left in high school, the court did not want to 
dislodge Emily from her placement and thus, awarded Mr. Astin the exclusive use and 
benefit of the home until Emily graduates from high school with her class or turns 18, which 
ever occurs last. During this time, Mr. Astin is to make the mortgage payments, pay the 
taxes, and maintain the house. Until the home is sold, Ms. Astin is benefiting as the debt is 
reduced and the home continues to appreciate. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Ms. Astin's request to 
have Mr. Astin pay one-half of uncovered medical expenses and insurance premiums upon 
the expiration of her health insurance COBRA coverage. The court determined that it was 
not appropriate to address this issue at that time because it was a matter of speculation of 
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whether Ms. Astin would be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA 
coverage. This issue is best addressed at a future date once the COBRA insurance lapses. 
At that time, the proceeds from the sale of the home will be distributed, there will be no 
child support, and if Mr. Astin is retired, the parties will each be receiving retirement 
benefits and social security. Medicare may also be a possibility at that time. 
A number of life insurance policies were established which were used like savings 
accounts. Loans were regularly taken out against the cash values of the policies. Mr. Astin 
borrowed against a policy established in Ms. Astin's name to pay for expenses in the home, 
Christmas expenses, and for Ms. Astin's schooling. As these were family related expenses, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Astin to restore one-half of the 
value of this loan. 
The trial court did not have adequate information before it to determine if Ms. 
Astin's attorney fees were reasonable. The trial court recognized that neither party has the 
ability to pay significant attorneys fees. Recognizing Mr. Astin's limited ability to pay 
attorneys fees, it was not an abuse of discretion to order Mr. Astin to pay $1,000.00 towards 
Ms. Astin's attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MS. ASTIN'S APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE SHE HAS 
FAILED TO PROPERLY DELINEATE THE ISSUES NOR INCLUDE 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT EACH ISSUE WAS 
PRESERVED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 24(a)(5) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
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Rule 24 (a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the brief of the 
appellant shall contain a statement of the issues presented for review. Effective July 1, 1994, 
Rule 24 (a)(5) further requires that appellants include citations to the record showing that 
each issue was preserved in the trial court or provide a statement of the grounds for seeking 
review of issues not preserved below. Ms. Astin's brief does not delineate actual issues for 
review. It merely cites in the Nature of the Proceedings section that Ms. Astin appeals 
certain provisions of the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. In preparing the brief of the appellee, Mr. Astin has had to outline issues which he 
assumed were on appeal. Nowhere does Ms. Astin's brief include citations to the record 
showing where each issue was preserved below. 
POINT II 
MS. ASTIN'S APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE SHE 
FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Ms. Astin has also failed to marshal the evidence as required. Her brief simply 
reargues the evidence that Ms. Astin believes supports her view of the case. Ms. Astin made 
no effort to recite the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. Because of Ms. 
Astin's failure to marshal the evidence, her challenge to the trial court's abuse of discretion 
should be dismissed without further consideration. "When the duty to marshal is not 
properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept 
the findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 
App. 1989). "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that 
the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of 
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the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Shepherd, 
v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah App. 1994). 
It is well recognized that trial courts are permitted broad discretion in divorce matters 
"so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Whitehead v. 
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 1992). "Where a trial court may exercise broad 
discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or 
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion.'" Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818-820 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Turner v. Turner. 749 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982)). To 
determine whether a trial court acted properly within its discretion, appropriate findings and 
conclusions must set forth the facts and reasons for the court's decision. Barnes v. Barnes, 
857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ap. 1993). In the instant case, Ms. Astin has failed to marshal the 
evidence indicating a clear abuse of discretion. The trial courts findings and conclusions 
must be accepted as valid. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE FINANCIAL 
CONDITIONS AND NEEDS OF THE RECEIVING SPOUSE, THE 
ABILITY OF THE RECEIVING SPOUSE, AND THE ABILITY OF THE 
RESPONDING SPOUSE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT IN DETERMINING 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
In reviewing whether spousal support is sufficient, a trial court's ruling should not be 
overturned if adequate findings are made supporting the ruling which demonstrate that the 
court exercised its discretion according to established standards. Willev v. Willev, 866 P.2d 
547, 550 (Utah App. 1993). In the instant case, the trial court made detailed findings 
supporting his ruling regarding alimony. The findings incorporated the three necessary 
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factors which need to be considered in determining whether alimony should be awarded: 
"(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide support." Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision refers directly to these factors established in 
Schindler. (R. 95). The trial court also recognized that "Any award of alimony, particularly 
after a marriage of long duration and to the extent possible, is intended to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." (R. 94). See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). 
In considering the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, the trial 
court recognized that Ms. Astin's financial condition and needs justified an award of 
alimony. The court found that Ms. Astin is currently incapable of earning a living and 
receives $429.00 per month in Social Security Disability benefits. (R. 110). Ms. Astin has 
been diagnosed as having depression and multiple personality disorder. (R. 110) (Tr. 55). In 
addition, she had a coronary bypass surgery in 1993. Because of her ailments, Ms. Astin 
takes a variety of medications. (R. 110). 
In 1994, at the time of trial, Ms. Astin was hospitalized because of severe depression 
(Tr. 59, 83). Previous to that, she had been hospitalized in 1993 for about 10 days, and for 
a four week period earlier in 1994. (Tr. 83, 84). The reason for her hospitalizations was to 
protect her from harming herself. On occasions, she has been suicidal. (Tr. 61, 62). Since 
April of 1994, Ms. Astin has resided with her sister (Tr. 66), which her doctor testified was 
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a healthy living situation (Tr. 62). Though Ms. Astin desired to establish herself in her own 
home at the time of trial, the court was more concerned that she have sufficient income to 
provide for her medical needs. (R. 91, 92). Ms. Astin testified that her monthly expenses, 
while living with her sister were $1,372.00. Those expenses would increase to $2,758.00 
were she to find a home of her own. (Tr. 71). With Ms. Astin's unstable medical and 
mental health condition at the time of trial, her needs were best met by living with her sister. 
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, the trial court 
provided a detailed analysis outlining Mr. Astin's ability to provide support. (R. 98, 112). 
Paragraphs 9 through 12 of the trial court's Findings of Fact specifically address this issue. 
Rather than reciting the paragraphs in their entirety, a brief summation indicates the 
following: 
(1) Mr. Astin is employed as an insurance salesman by Prudential Insurance 
Company and acts as an independent broker for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, Gem 
Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. 
(2) His taxable income for 1991 through 1993 was (a) $49,062 in 1991; (b) 
63,074.00 in 1992; and (c) 44,839.00 in 1993. 
(3) The 1992 income was uniquely high as it included $19,100.00 of renewal 
income earned during the months of 1991 in which Mr. Astin was receiving disability 
insurance income as a result of triple by-pass surgery which prohibited his employer from 
applying the renewal income to his 1991 income. 
(4) Subtracting the 19,100.00 from Mr. Astin's 1992 income, the average 
annual income of Mr. Astin from 1991 through 1993 was found to be $45,958.33, giving 
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Mr. Astin an average monthly income of $3,829.36. 
(5) The trial court permitted Mr. Astin to deduct one-half of his claimed 
employee business expenses totaling $328.00 per month leaving $3,501.36 as Mr. Astin's 
average gross monthly income. 
(6) Deducting $875.72 as the average monthly income withholding for 
federal, state, and social security taxes during the years 1991 through 1994, Mr. Astin's net 
average monthly income was found to be $2,626.64. 
(7) Not permitting Mr. Astin to include his voluntary support of the parties' 
adult children and their grandchild in his monthly expenses, the court found an appropriate 
deduction for his stated monthly expenses to be $1,900.00. Deducting this amount from the 
net average monthly income of $2,626.64, $726.64 was left remaining. 
(8) The minor child receives $189.00 a month as a result of Ms. Astin's 
disability. This amount, together with Ms. Astin's obligation to support the minor child, is 
significantly reflected in Mr. Astin's monthly expenses. For these reasons, the court found 
that an independent amount of child support should not be considered when determining the 
parties' monthly expenses or the amount of alimony awarded to Defendant 
(9) Based upon Mr. Astin's net average monthly income of $2,626.64 (see 
footnote 1) and Ms. Astin's net average monthly income of $429.00, and based upon the 
parties needs and responsibilities, a reasonable amount of alimony was determined to be 
$600.00 per month. 
With only $726.64 remaining after deducting taxes and expenses, $600.00 per month 
for alimony is a financial burden for Mr. Astin. Mr. Astin testified that the most he could 
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pay for alimony was between $300.00 and $400.00 a month. (Tr. 28). Mr. Astin further 
testified that to pay the $1,000.00 per month payment for temporary alimony (R. 22), her 
was required to borrow money from his insurance policies as well as liquidate assets in his 
401K or borrow on his 401K. (Tr. 28). Due to his age and health conditions, Mr. Astin is 
not able to put in the time and effort to produce the income he used to. (Tr. 17, 18). He 
also faces retirement in the near future. Considering these factors, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding $600.00 in alimony. The trial court recognized that the 
purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife, not to reward her or to inflict a 
penalty upon the husband. (R. 94). See English v. English, 575 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
POINT IV 
WITH A MINOR CHILD REMAINING AT HOME, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING THE 
EXCLUSIVE USE AND BENEFIT OF THE HOME TO THE PRIMARY 
CUSTODIAN UNTIL THE MINOR CHILD GRADUATES WITH HER 
CLASS OR REACHES THE AGE OF 18. 
At the time of trial, the parties had one remaining minor child, to-wit: Emily Astin, 
bora July 7, 1978. Emily is scheduled to graduate from high school in the spring of 1996. 
The court was very concerned about Emily's well being. The court did not want to 
"dislodge her from her schooling and her participation and force her to go somewhere else 
where Mr. Astin could afford to rent another house." (Tr. 155). The mortgage payments for 
the home are $641.00 per month (Ex. 5). The trial court further observed that "Right now, 
in this valley, renting and buying is extremely difficult. I am not so sure that he could even 
get a place which would qualify for his daughter to go to the same high school. Certainly, it 
would move her away from her friends and the neighborhood where she has been 
15 
accustomed." (Tr. 155, 156). The court found that, having two years left in high school, to 
enable Emily to continue to enjoy the same security and surroundings that her siblings have 
enjoyed during their minority, it is reasonable and appropriate that Mr. Astin be awarded the 
exclusive use and benefit of the home until Emily graduates from high school with her class 
or turns 18, whichever occurs last. During this time, Mr. Astin is to make the mortgage 
payments, pay the taxes, and maintaining the home in its present condition. (R. 107). 
As previously addressed, at the time of trial, Ms. Astin was hospitalized, with her 
state of stability unsure. Since April of 1994, she was residing with her sister which is a 
healthy living situation. Until the home is sold, Ms. Astin is actually benefitting as the debt 
is reduced and the home continues to appreciate. In the mean time, Emily is permitted to 
live in a home where Mr. Astin can pay reasonable mortgage payments. With a limited 
income, Mr. Astin would have a difficult time finding a suitable residence for him and Emily 
to live where the monthly mortgage or rent payments would be comparable. 
POINT V 
IT IS A MATTER OF SPECULATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
MS. ASTIN WILL BE UNINSURABLE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF 
HER COBRA INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
Ms. Astin has argued that upon the expiration of her COBRA insurance coverage, she 
will be uninsurable. In her Proposed Finding of Fact And Conclusions of Law, Ms. Astin 
argued that each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all uncovered medical expenses 
and insurance premiums upon the expiration of her COBRA coverage. (R. 91, 104). The 
court found that whether or not Ms. Astin would be uninsurable upon the conclusion of her 
COBRA coverage was a matter of speculation . The court would not address this issue at the 
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time of trial. The court determined that should this possibility become reality, Ms. Astin 
could petition the court for a modification of the divorce decree based upon a material 
change of circumstances. (R. 103, 104). 
The period of time between the date of the decree of divorce and the time Ms. Astin's 
COBRA coverage expires will be three years. During this time, many events will and may 
take place. The minor child will have become an adult, and the house will be sold with the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. Though Ms. Astin was determined to be 
currently incapable of earning a living, the court also found that this could change if a proper 
treatment is found. (R. 110). It is possible that Ms. Astin could be employed with some 
insurance coverage. Within this three year period, Mr. Astin will be eligible for retirement. 
If he is retired, each party would then be receiving one-half of the retirement benefits. (R. 
105, 114). At that time, Medicare insurance may also be available. There may be other 
possibilities. 
No evidence was presented to indicate that Ms. Astin would not be insurable upon the 
expiration of her COBRA coverage. At that time, Mr, Astin may be in no better position 
than Ms. Astin. At the time of trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to order Mr. Astin to pay one-half of all uncovered medical expenses and insurance 
premiums upon the expiration of Ms. Astin's COBRA coverage. As the trial court 
recognized, this issue would best be revisited once the COBRA coverage expires and the 
situation of the parties is known. (R. 103, 104). 
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POINT VI 
THE LOANS TAKEN OUT AGAINST THE WIFE'S LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICY WERE USED FOR FAMILY EXPENSES. 
During the marriage, Mr. Astin established a number of life insurance policies which 
were in essence, used like savings accounts. (Tr. 122, 129-132). The premium payments 
were maintained by Mr. Astin. (Tr. 122). Mr. Astin regularly borrowed against the policies. 
He borrowed against the policy established in Ms. Astin's name to pay for expenses in the 
home, Christmas expenses, and for Ms. Astin's schooling. (Tr. 122). The trial court 
recognized that these loans were used for family expenses. (Tr. 161). 
Property and alimony awards are to be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. HowelL 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
By marshalling the evidence, it is apparent that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion by ordering Mr. Astin to restore to Ms. Astin's policy one-half of the value of 
said loans. (Tr. 104). 
POINT VII 
RECOGNIZING THAT NEITHER PARTY HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY 
SIGNIFICANT ATTORNEYS FEES, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING MR. ASTIN TO CONTRIBUTE $1,000 
TOWARDS MS. ASTIN'S ATTORNEYS FEES. 
In determining whether attorneys fees should be awarded, the trial court must 
consider similar factors as when awarding alimony. When awarding attorneys fees, "the trial 
court must find (1) the requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the requested 
fees are reasonable; and (3) the other spouse has the ability to pay". Muir v. Muir, 841 
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P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court's Memorandum Decision specifically 
recognized these factors. (R. 90, 91). 
Reviewing the trial court's analysis in arriving at its ruling regarding alimony, there is 
no question that Ms. Astin is in need of financial assistance. Furthermore, it is evident that 
Mr. Astin has a lack of ability to pay attorneys fees. Mr. Astin testified that he was having 
a hard time paying for his own attorney fees. (Tr. 29). The trial court found that neither 
party has the ability to pay significant attorneys fees, but found that Mr. Astin should 
contribute to Ms. Astin's attorneys fees in the sum of $1,000.00. 
Regarding the factor of whether the requested fees are reasonable, the trial court 
struggled with determining if the attorneys fees requested by Ms. Astin were reasonable. 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision reads as follows: 
As to defendant's claim for attorney fees and court costs in the amount of 
$3,579.00, the Court notes that defendant has not submitted an affidavit 
regarding her attorney's hourly rates, the total number of hours expended on 
this case, or the itemization of how much attorney time was expended on the 
various matters related to this case. In fact, defendant has had several 
attorneys representing her throughout the course of this divorce, and the Court 
has no evidence before it as to whether the amount of attorney fees sought is 
the amount incurred solely by defendant's current attorney or the total amount 
incurred by all the attorneys who have represented defendant at various stages 
of the proceedings. (R. 91). 
With Mr. Astin's limited ability to pay, and the apparent question of the 
reasonableness of attorneys fees, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering 
Mr. Astin to pay $1,000.00 to Ms. Astin for attorney fees. (R. 113). 
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POINT VIII 
ONLY IF APPELLANT PREVAILS ON ISSUES ON APPEAL SHOULD 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS BE CONSIDERED. IF THERE IS AN 
AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS, IT SHOULD BE 
VERY LIMITED. 
As Ms. Astin's brief points out, when fees in a divorce have been awarded below to 
the party who then prevails on appeal, fees may then be awarded to that party on appeal. 
See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). In the instant case, if Ms. Astin 
prevails on issues on appeal, the same factors need to be considered that are considered in 
the lower court when awarding attorneys fees. As provided in Point VII of Mr. Astin's 
argument, these factors are: (1) the requesting party's need for financial assistance; (2) the 
reasonableness of the requested fees; and (3) the other spouses ability to pay". Muir v. 
Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992). 
Based upon Mr. Astin's limited ability to pay, an award of attorneys fees should be 
very limited, and then, only if Ms. Astin prevails on issues on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Astin's appeal should be rejected as her brief is procedurally defective. The 
brief fails to delineate the issues on appeal nor include citations to the record as required by 
Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. More importantly, Ms. Astin failed 
to marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by awarding Ms. Astin $600.00 per month alimony. The trial court properly 
awarded Mr. Astin the exclusive use and benefit of the home until the minor child graduates 
from high school or reaches the age of 18. The trial court properly denied Ms. Astin's 
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request that Mr. Astin pay one-half of uncovered medical expenses and insurance premiums 
upon the expiration of her health insurance COBRA coverage. The trial court exercised 
proper discretion by ordering Mr. Astin to reimburse one-half of the loans that he had taken 
out against Ms. Astin's whole-life insurance policy. It was not an abuse of discretion to 
award wife $1,000.00 of her attorneys fees. Only if Ms. Astin were to prevail on issues on 
appeal should attorneys fees and costs be considered. Any such award should be limited 
because of Mr. Astin's limited ability to pay. 
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